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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
trials upon these grounds is said to be not reviewable on appeal,29 unless
there is a gross abuse of discretion.8 0 In an early case there is a dictum
that a trial judge may not revise or correct the verdict of a jury, but is
limited to setting it aside in a proper case. 31 However, more recent
cases indicate that the judge does have the power to revise a jury's
verdict, although no case affirmatively holds that a trial judge may deny
a motion for a new trial upon condition that the non-moving party
consent to a reduction or increase in damages, according as they are
excessive or inadequate. It has been held that a trial judge may not
enter a verdict for a less amount than that found by the jury without
the plaintiff's consent.82 The compelling inference to be drawn from
this case is that if the plaintiff consented to a remittitur the court might
deny the defendant a new trial. The same implication is found in
another case.33 Three other recent cases 34 clearly indicate that the
practice of the trial judge reducing excessive verdicts upon the consent
of the plaintiff is widely followed in North Carolina. These cases are
based upon a statute35 which authorizes the trial court to set aside
excessive verdicts.
When the problem of the principal case is presented to the North
Carolina Supreme Court, it is submitted that the court will pursue a
wiser course if the majority state cases are followed. Such a result
would be logically consistent with the procedure approved in the cases
mentioned above. It would tend to accelerate the now sluggish
processes of trial and appellate practise, thereby reducing the costs of
litigation. After the jury has first determined where the liability falls,
there is no serious invasion of its functions in permitting the trial judge
to revise the amount of damages. WELCH JORDAN.
Vendor and Purchaser-Restrictive Covenant-Marketable Title.
A covenant restricting the use of real property is perhaps the most
widely used device for protecting residential districts from the inroads
of business and industrial establishments.1 While first enforced in
'See cases cited supra, notes 27 and 28.
Pender v. North State Life Insurance Co., 163 N. C. 98, 79 S. E. 293 (1913).
Shields v. Whitaker, 82 N. C. 516, 522, 523 (1880).
"Isley v. Virginia Bridge & Iron Co., 143 N. C. 51, 55 S. E. 416 (1906).
'Decker v. Norfolk & Southern R. R. Co., 167 N. C. 26, 83 S. E. 27 (1914).
- Bizzell v. Auto Tire & Equipment Co., 182 N. C. 98, 108 S. E. 439 (1921) ;
Bailey v. Dibbrell Mineral Co., 183 N. C. 525, 112 S. E. 29 (1922); Hyatt v.
McCoy, 194 N. C. 760, 138 S. E. 405 (1927).
N. C. CODE AN. (Michie 1931) §591.
The more recent development and use of zoning ordinances offers another
method of protection. For a comparison of the utility of the two methods, see
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equity against a subsequent owner of the restricted property on a theory
of prevention of unjust enrichment, 2 courts today enforce these cove-
nants upon two general theories: first, as contracts concerning land ;3
and second, as easements or servitudes on the property restricted. 4 An
objection to the first view is that it may result in creating a right where
none should exist. Thus, where an injunction against breach of the
covenant would be refused because of radical change in the character
of the neighborhood, it was still held that a vendee was justified in
refusing a deed on the grounds that the possibility of an action at law
for damages rendered the vendor's title unmarketable. 5 Though the
restriction had long been obsolete, its ghost was allowed to continue to
haunt the unfortunate realty owner.
6
But the second theory has also given some difficulty. For example,
if the character of the neighborhood has so radically changed that the
property is no longer useful for residential purposes, courts quite com-
monly refuse an injunction.7 Yet under the proprietary theory this
amounts to a deprivation of property. As a way out some courts have
Van Hecke, Zoning Ordinances and Restrictions in Deeds (1928) 37 YALE L. 3.
407.
2 "Of course the price would be affected by the covenant, and nothing could be
more inequitable than that the original purchaser should be able to sell the
property the next day for a greater price, in consideration of the assignee being
allowed to escape from the liability which he had himself undertaken." Tulk v.
Moxhay, 2 Phil. 774 (Ch. 1848).
'Wiegman v. Kusel, 270 Ill. 520, 110 N. E. 884 (1915); Windemere-Grand
Improvement Ass'n v. American Bank, 205 Mich. 539, 172 N. W. 29 (1919);
Stone, The Equitable Rights and Liabilities of a Stranger to a Contracp (1918) 18
COL. L. REV. 291; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2nd ed. 1920) §396.
'Weil v. Hill, 193 Ala. 407, 69 So. 438 (1915) ; Riverbank Improvement Co. v.
'Chadwick, 228 Mass. 242, 117 N. E. 244 (1917) ; Pound, The Progress of the Law,
1918-1919; Equitable Restrictions (1919) 33 HARv. L. REV. 813.
'Bull v. Burton, 227 N. Y. 101, 124 N. E. 111 (1919) (Covenant of 1864
against use of lot on Fifth Avenue for "any stable either public or private." In
1919 the lot was worth $19,700 a foot on the Avenue. Though the restriction
would not have been enforced in equity, it was thought to be yet sufficiently alive
"at law" to make the owner's title unmarketable.) ; see Genske v. Jensen, 188 Wis.
17, 205 N. W. 548 (1925) ; cf. Postley v. Kafka, 213 App. Div. 595, 211 N. Y. S.
382 (1925).
'Another objection which has been raised to this theory is that even with a very
liberal application of the third party beneficiary doctrine it is difficult to justify
the right of action commonly given certain parties. "It seems an unreal con-
clusion to say that when A promised a realty development company not to conduct
a business upon Blackacre, a contract was made of which an intended beneficiary
was A's son, B, in a suit against A's daughter C, upon descent and division of
Blackacre." CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND (1929)
151. While this objection might have some weight in a state such as New York
where the right of a third party beneficiary to a contract to sue is narrowly con-
fined, it should not present any difficulties in states where that right is not so
limited.
'Hurt v. Hejhal, 259 Ill. App. 221 (1930) ; Klug v. Kreisch, 246 Mich. 14, 224
N. W. 339 (1929); Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311
(1882) ; Starkey v. Gardner, 194 N. C. 74, 138 S. E. 408 (1927) ; Notes (1928) 54
A. L. R. 812; (1933) 85 A. L. R_ 985.
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suggested a recovery of damages after denial of the injunction.8 But
this is in effect to force a sale of a property right for a private purpose.9
In view of these difficulties the following has been suggested as a
better solution: while these restrictions are servitudes on the land
itself, and should be enforced as such, when the purpose of the restric-
tion can no longer be carried out the servitude comes to an end for all
purposes; i.e., the duration of the servitude is determined by its pur-
pose.1 o
The North Carolina Court has in effect reached this very result. In
Starkey v. Gardner" an injunction was denied on the ground that
changed conditions had made impossible the fulfillment of the purpose
for which the restriction was imposed. The judgment of the lower
court, affirmed on appeal, was that "the restrictions created in said
deed ...are no longer in effect, and the property of the defendant
is no longer subject to said restrictions, ... and that the said defend-
ant, her agents or assigns, are not bound by the terms of said restric-
tions, and they are permitted to use said lands and property for any
lawful purposes."'12 There is here no hint of the possibility that the
restriction is still alive for the purpose of collecting damages for its
breach. This conclusion receives additional support in the recent case
of Snyder v. Caldwell.13 This was an action by the vendor for specific
performance of a contract to exchange lands. The vendee had refused
to accept a deed on the ground that the plaintiff could not convey good
title since there was a restrictive covenant. But the court held for the
plaintiff, basing its decision on the Starkey case, and holding that the
restriction was no longer enforceable because of changed conditions.
While the case does not specifically exclude the possibility that damages
might still be collected at law, it is a familiar rule that the purchaser of
land is not required to accept a title which invites or exposes him to
S Ewertsen v. Gerstenberg, 186 Ill. 344, 57 N. E. 1051 (1900) ; Jackson v.
Stevenson, 156 Mass. 496, 31 N. E. 691 (1892); Page v. Murray, 46 N. J. Eq.
325, 19 Atl. 11 (1890) ; McClure v. Leaycraft, 183 N. Y. 36, 75 N. E. 961 (1905).
'A statute which sought to provide expressly for the procedure adopted offhand
by the decisions -was held unconstitutional as depriving the dominant owners of
rights in real property for a private use contrary to the Bill of Rights, in River-
bank Improvement Co. v. Chadwick, 228 Mass. 242, 117 N. E. 244 (1917).
" "When such burdens are terminated by change in the character of the
neighborhood-now a recognized form of termination-or otherwise, the interest
definitely ceases. No pale relics are left to trouble and not to benefit the property
owners." CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND (1929) 153;
Pound, The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919; Equitable Servitudes (1919) 33
HARv. L. REv. 813.
21194 N. C. 74, 138 S. E. 408 (1927). This case is followed in Higgins v.
Hough, 195 N. C. 652, 143 S. E. 212 (1928); Oldham v. McPheeters, 203 N. C.
141, 164 S. E. 731 (1932).
1 Italics added.
1207 N. C. 626, 178 S. E. 83 (1935).
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litigation.14 It would seem inferentially, therefore, that the title of. the
plaintiff in the instant case was now clear of the restriction even to the
extent of being free from the possibility of liability for damages because
of breach of the restriction. In short, the net effect of the North Caro-
lina cases is that the restriction may be terminated by changed condi-
tions, and when so terminated it is ended for all purposes.
F. M. PARxER.
Wills-Remainders-Life Tenant Vested with
Absolute Power of Disposal.
The testator devised his real property to his wife giving her the
"right and privilege to use, sell or dispose of the same as she may see
fit during her lifetime," and he further provided that any property re-
maining at his wife's death should belong to the plaintiff. At her death
the wife devised the property to the defendant. The West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals adhered to an "ancient rule" in holding that
the testator's will vested a fee simple estate in the wife thereby cutting
off the plaintiff's remainder.1
It is generally accepted that a remainder over after a devise of an
unlimited estate plus an absolute power of disposal is invalid since the
first taker is vested with a fee simple.2 A few jurisdictions, including
West Virginia, have held that a devise of a life estate and the attach-
ment thereto of an unlimited power of disposition created a fee simple
in the life tenant to the exclusion of any remainder.3 The fee simple
estate thus vested was subject to all incidents normally attended upon
" Wesley v. Eells, 177 U. S. 370, 44 L. ed. 811, 20 Sup. Ct. 661 (1900).
'Hustead v. Murray, 177 S. E. 898 (W. Va., 1934).
In this case note the author has endeavored, in so far as it was possible, to
consider only those cases in which a life estate in realty was expressly limited to
the first taker and in which his -power of disposal was unlimited. However, some
of the difficulties involved in any classification or generalization concerning the
construction of wills are indicated in the following quotation: "Seldom, if ever,
vill two wills be found the exact counterpart of each other, either in language or
circumstances. We may look to cases for general rules as guides, but, after all,
each case must be decided upon the language used by the testator,- and upon his
intention, to be gathered from the whole instrument." Jones v. Denning, 91 Mich..
481, 51 N. W. 1119 (1892).
2 Hambright v. Carroll, 204 N. C. 496, 168 S. E. 817 (1933) ; see Gildersleeve
v. Lee, 100 Ore. 578, 198 Pac. 246 (1921). RooD, WILus (2nd ed. 1926) 534.
Note (1931) 75 A. L. R. 71.
' Gibson v. Gibson, 213 Mich. 31, 181 N. W. 41 (1921) ; Van Deventer v. Mc-
Mullen, 157 Tenn. 571, 11 S. W. (2d) 867 (1928) ; Steffey v. King, 126 Va. 120,
101 S. E. 62 (1919) ; National Surety Co. v. Jarrett, 95 W. Va. 420, 121 S. E. 291
(1924) ; Notes (1925) 36 A. L. R. 1218; (1932) 76 A. L. R. 1166.
However, the attachment of a limited power of disposition would not enlarge
the life tenant's interest to a fee. Waller v. Sproles, 160 Tenn. 11, 22 S. W. (2d)
4 (1929) ; Woodbridge v. Woodbridge, 88 W. Va. 187, 106 S. E. 437 (1921) ; Note
(1930) 8 TENN L. Rv. 209.
